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Abstract 
The Senkaku Islands dispute in the East China Sea stands as a major territorial dispute between the 
People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Japan. This dispute has periodically reemerged in the interactions 
between these two states between 1895, when the Senkaku Islands were definitively administered by 
Japan, and the present day. The dispute has undergone significant changes both in its emphasis by the 
PRC and Japan as well as what the dispute is about. At its early stages, the Senkaku Islands dispute was 
largely ignored by both China and Japan. Between 1971 and 1978, when the Senkaku Islands dispute 
became more noticeable internationally, the dispute was deemphasized to promote normalization of 
relations between the PRC and Japan. However, after the 1980s, with a rising PRC and somewhat 
economically and militarily weaker Japan, the dispute emerged with new intensity. In turning to the focus 
of the Senkaku Islands dispute, this has involved both economic interests, such as the resources in and 
around the adjacent seabed, as well as elements of popular nationalism. The Senkaku Islands dispute has 
created significant tensions and military development between Japan and the PRC. This paper examines 
how the Senkaku Islands dispute has driven militarization between the PRC and Japan.  
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 The territorial dispute of the Senkaku Islands, known as the Diaoyu Islands in the 
People’s Republic of China (PRC) has emerged in the last fifty years as a major 
flashpoint in the bilateral relationship between the PRC and Japan. This current tension 
has persisted since 2012, which marked the purchase and their subsequent 
nationalization of the Senkaku Islands by the Japanese government from a private 
owner. The current tensions over Senkaku Islands dispute, despite its recent appearance 
as an event of global note, is rooted much further in the past. Indeed, the dispute itself 
stems from claims staked by China over the Senkaku Islands and the surrounding waters 
since 1895. This dispute is significantly rooted in the history of the surrounding region 
and the interconnected histories of these two players in particular.  
 The dispute has significant potential for spilling over into a broader conflict that 
could involve other players. Although the main dispute is between China and Japan, the 
United States also could potentially become involved in the dispute. One main reason 
for this is rooted in the fact that the United States plays a significant role in defending 
Japan, as seen in the Mutual Security Treaty between the two countries. Additionally, 
with China’s rising role in the Asia-Pacific region coupled with the already preeminent 
place the US has in the region could lead to greater conflict between the two countries. 
The Senkaku Islands dispute has a significant impact on the ties between China and 
Japan as well as the ties between the US and Japan and Japan and China.  
 In this paper, I will argue that the territorial dispute of the Senkaku Islands in the 
region between the PRC and Japan is the main driver for a marked increase in 
militarization between the PRC and Japan. This militarization has been sparked by an 
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economic competition for resources in the region surrounding the Senkaku Islands. 
These resources include energy sources such as oil, but also access to rare earth minerals 
essential to the high technology that plays major roles in the economies of Japan and the 
PRC. Additionally, the dispute of the islands is enabled and allowed to continue by the 
nationalism and military development from both sides. In terms of nationalism, the 
Senkaku Islands dispute is connected to the shared history of the PRC and Japan. To the 
PRC, the Senkaku Islands represents an integral component of Chinese territory coupled 
with its access to resources. For the government of the PRC and its people, backing 
down on its stance on the Senkaku Islands would be a sign of China returning to being 
coerced by foreign powers (such as Japan) and returning to its century of humiliation. 
For Japan, possessing the islands reflects the promotion of a correct view of history. 
With the military development, both sides have invested in improved aerospace and 
naval technologies and techniques that have allowed them to maintain a forward 
presence in the vicinity of the Senkaku Islands.  
 




 The disputes over territory that occurred in the East China Sea have impacted the 
interactions in Northeast Asia between China and Japan. Additionally, the impact 
yielded by the disputes in the East China Sea has impacted a number of areas affiliated 
with this bilateral relationship. The historical survey of the issues concerning the 
Senkaku Islands dispute has varied over the years in the focus of its analysis. The 
earliest researchers aimed their scholarly examinations on the legal status and 
negotiation of the various claims on the Senkaku Islands. Further research in the 1970s 
and 1980s investigated how the dispute was driven by competition over control of 
economic resources in the East China Sea, with scholars variously looking into rare 
earth minerals mining on the seabed floor and oil extraction. Moreover, scholars 
evaluated the laws that impacted this territorial dispute. As the dispute entered the 
twentieth century, other scholars focused on the dispute as being more nationalist than 
economic in nature. Additionally, scholars examined other areas of Sino-Japanese ties 
that the dispute might impact. In particular, military development of China and Japan 
was examined as relates to the Sino-Japanese tensions in the East China Sea. Even then, 
some scholars would return to economic concerns as the main driver of the dispute, with 
considerable focus on both oil and rare earth minerals.  
1970s-1980s  
 The earliest writers on the subject of the Senkaku Islands dispute focused on the 
laws surrounding the claims posed by both Japan and China. These works attempted to 
make sense of the legal dilemmas that the Senkaku Islands dispute conjured by looking 
to past examples and applying them to the current case. One instance of this can be seen 
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in Tao Cheng’s examination of the Senkaku Islands. Cheng examines multiple 
international legal cases in his analysis of the dispute. Chiefly, these cases are rooted in 
the principle of discovery-occupation.1 Tao also examines the use of intertemporal law 
as it applies to the Senkaku Islands case. Here, he applies the Islands of Palmas case to 
the on how the islands came to be occupied by Japan.2 The early interpretations of the 
Senkaku Islands case were rooted in the legal perceptions of previous cases and rules on 
territorial acquisition.   
 Other scholars in the 1970s focused on analysis of the territorial dispute as it 
impacted seminal events in bilateral Sino-Japanese ties, such as the Sino-Japanese 
Treaty of Friendship of 1978. In this analysis, the Senkaku Islands dispute plays a role 
as a stumbling block to the normalization of the Sino-Japanese relations. Indeed, some 
scholars noted that although both the governments of the PRC and Japan desired a 
resolution to the dispute, there were different parties within both governments that 
sought to undermine the treaty by resurrecting the dispute.3 Coupled with the emphasis 
on other elements of internal government, there was a focus on the Senkaku Islands and 
its link to the treaty negotiations. Namely, there is a focus on the Senkaku Islands and 
the actions of the Japanese and Chinese governments to disconnect them from 
negotiations.4 Such scholarship notes that the early stages of contemporary relations 
sought to not focus on the Senkaku Islands for the sake of more important challenges. 
                                                         
1 Tao Cheng, “The Sino-Japanese Dispute Over the Tiao-yu-tai (Senkaku) Islands and the Law of 
Territorial Acquisition,” Virginia Journal of International Law 14, no. 2 (1974): 223. 
2 Ibid., 223.  
3 Daniel Tretiak, “The Sino-Japanese Treaty of 1978: The Senkaku Incident Prelude,” Asian Survey 18, 
no. 12 (1978): 1237.  




 In the 1990s, the end of the Cold War brought about a reassessment of security 
as it related to the Senkaku Islands. In this era, scholars examined how China and Japan 
might perceive each other as a threat to their security. To the PRC, Japan in this era had 
greater access to superior military technology than what the Chinese military currently 
possessed, especially in anti-submarine warfare, multirole fighter aircraft, and anti-
ballistic missile systems, including the Patriot and the Aegis systems.5 Moreover, 
scholars focused on the PRC’s perceptions on Japan in particular. To China at this time, 
while Japan seemed unlikely to become a superpower, it was their great fear that Japan 
could become a regional military power on par with the capabilities of France and the 
United Kingdom.6 Due to these fears of Japan’s military potential, these anxieties 
influenced China’s future military development.  
 Simultaneously, other scholars focused on Japan’s fears of Chinese military 
development as it pertained to the Senkaku Islands dispute. In the case of the PRC, 
many of these acquisitions had not yet been realized in this time. For instance, some 
academics pointed to the PRC’s bid to obtain the former Soviet aircraft carrier Varyag as 
worrying to Japanese policy makers, given the increase in China’s power projection 
capabilities that such an acquisition represented.7 Additionally, the improvements to the 
Chinese military, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) that had been fulfilled to that 
point also worried Japan’s leadership in relation to the Senkaku Islands. These 
enhancements to the PLA included the purchase of the Sukhoi Su-27 Flanker multirole                                                         
5 Thomas J. Christensen, “China, the US-Japan Alliance, and the Security Dilemma in East Asia,” 
International Security, 23, no. 4 (1999): 56.  
6 Ibid., 56.  
7 Eugene Brown, “Japanese Security Policy in the Post Cold War Era: Threat Perceptions and Strategic 
Options,” Asian Survey 34, no. 5 (1994): 435.  
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fighter from Russia, which has a combat radius of 1,500 kilometers, giving a major 
boost to the aerial power projection capabilities of the PLA.8 The developments in the 
PLA were argued by some to be linked to the newfound assertiveness that China had 
with territory it disputed with its neighbors. In the case of the Senkaku Islands, with the 
promulgation of the Territorial Waters Law and its mandate to expel military invaders 
by force in the event of enemy incursions into any territory claimed by China, this 
created fear into the Japanese leadership when seen alongside the new military 
developments made by the PRC.9 
 At this point, other scholars focused on the Senkaku Islands dispute as it related 
to the legitimation of the Communist Party of China’s (CCP) regime. In the aftermath of 
the Cultural Revolution and at the dawn of China’s reopening with Deng Xiaoping’s rise 
to power, some scholars argued that the CCP was no longer able to use Maoism to 
maintain its hold on power, especially with the Communist regimes of Eastern Europe 
and Central Asia collapsing around the PRC.10 As a result, the CCP sought new anchors 
to set to preserve the integrity of its hold on power. Some scholars pointed one such 
anchor as the Senkaku Islands themselves, by using the CCP’s strong stance on the 
issue, especially vis-à-vis to China’s former imperialist foe Japan, as a move to court 
support from a domestic audience.11  
2000s- the Present 
An important school of thought that has continued regarding the relationship 
between the PRC and Japan is the change in how they perceive each other’s power in the                                                         
8 Ibid., 435.  
9 Ibid., 436.  
10 Ericka Strecker Downs and Phillip C. Saunders, “Legitimacy and the Limits of Nationalism: China and 
Diaoyu Islands,” International Security 23, no. 3 (1998): 117.  
11 Ibid., 123.  
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dispute. Here, the territorial disputes are a part of a larger Sino-Japanese rivalry that is 
increasingly filled with tension.12 The rivalry between Japan and the PRC has seen a 
larger uptick in intensity over the last fifteen years. Additionally, scholars of this decade 
continued to focus on the shared Sino-Japanese history. From the PRC’s perspective, it 
views any attempts by Japan to assert control over the controversial territory as a move 
reminiscent of late nineteenth and early twentieth century attempts by Japan to create an 
empire throughout Asia, including China.13 Another component of this politicized 
history linked to Japan’s contemporary actions is World War II, which is referenced by 
China in relation to Japanese atrocities such the Rape of Nanjing.14 With the emergence 
of history in the context of the disputes of the East China Sea, this has lead to dangerous 
shifts in the rhetoric surrounding territorial disputes, which could serve to destabilize the 
dispute, and lead to further conflict between China and Japan.  
 Another area of interest for scholars of this time was comparisons to past 
bilateral economic relationships marked by similar tensions. One area that was heavily 
examined was the concept of rising nationalism. In some viewings of nationalism, 
writers focused on historic examples to explain the changes of the time. In certain 
works, the Senkaku Islands dispute was examined with the Anglo-German tensions prior 
to World War I as a viewpoint.15 With this example, some scholars pointed to how even 
with economic interdependency between two rival states, there can be major issues 
between those two countries that can lead to war. In fact, scholars point to the fact that 
closer contact in the case of China and Japan has highlighted how contemporary Japan                                                         
12 Kent E. Calder, “China and Japan’s Simmering Rivalry,” Foreign Affairs 129, 140 (2006): 129. 
13 Ibid., 129. 
14 Ibid., 129. 
15 Leszek Buszynski. "Sino-Japanese Relations: Interdependence, Rivalry and Regional Security." 
Contemporary Southeast Asia: A Journal Of International & Strategic Affairs 31, no. 1 (2009): 143.  
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has lived up to certain fears held by the PRC, such as the fact that Japan has not 
renounced its militaristic history, which aggravates the dispute further.16 The 
connections to nationalism in relation to the shared and tense history between China and 
Japan over much of the last 150 years were also substantially linked to the causes of the 
dispute. Indeed, some writers point to World War II, which the Chinese refer to as the 
War of Resistance as a constant plague to relations between China and Japan.17 This 
nationalism has continued to thrive in the years following the resurgence of the Senkaku 
Islands.   
With the resurgence of the territorial dispute into its present form in the 2010s, 
one major cause that researchers attribute to the Senkaku Islands dispute in impacting 
the bilateral relationship between China and Japan are the competition for the extraction 
of certain resources. One facet of this is the petrochemical resources that can be found in 
the East China Sea. Some scholars point to fact that the East China Sea contains 160 
billion gallons of oil and trillions of cubic feet of natural gas.18 The economic necessity 
to import large quantities of energy for the economies of China and Japan nearby only 
exacerbates the Senkaku Islands dispute. China’s increasing economic growth has 
caused it to require increasingly greater energy needs, more than it can find within its 
own borders. Indeed, China has become the second largest net importer of oil in the 
world.19 Scholars also recalled that Japan’s oil imports have grown, for it became the 
third largest importer of crude oil in the world.20 With imports slated to grow for both 
                                                        
16 Ibid., 153.  
17 Kent E. Calder, “China and Japan’s Simmering Rivalry,” Foreign Affairs 85, no. 2 (2006): 132.  
18 Mark J. Valencia, "The East China Sea Disputes: History, Status, and Ways Forward," Asian 
Perspective 38, no. 2 (2014): 185. 
19 Ibid., 185. 
20 Ibid., 185. 
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China and Japan, the dispute could be posed to grow based on this.21 This is only further 
complicated by China’s presence in drilling for natural resources closer to the disputed 
boundaries in the East China Sea. Further, other economic concerns including access to 
prime fishing territory is also a profound strain to the dispute.22 The economic factors 
led to impact on the relationship between Japan and the PRC 
Scholars also examined the role that mineral extraction played in the relation 
between the resources around the Senkaku Islands dispute and the militarization of the 
conflict over the islands. This area of scholarship into the Senkaku Islands dispute 
emerged with the rise of an economy driven by high technology in the 2010s.23 Another 
focus of this scholarship has emerged with the Japan and the PRC’s increasing focus on 
the importation of minerals (especially rare earth minerals) necessary to maintain 
economies driven by high technology. Indeed, the PRC and Japan are the two largest net 
importers of rare earth minerals globally.24 Scholars also point to different issues 
constraining the mining of rare earth minerals in the PRC and Japan. For the PRC, many 
of its sources for rare earth minerals are being exhausted.25 For Japan, the PRC’s 
increasingly strict export controls have also been discussed as driving Japan to seek new 
sources of rare earth minerals.26 
 Also in the 2010s, some scholars focused on the dispute from the perspective of 
the respective militaries of China and Japan, where one must consider the development 
of the Japanese military. J. Miller Berkshire considers the impact of Japan’s military                                                         
21 Ibid., 185.  
22 Ibid., 185.  
23 Ming Hwa Ting and John Seaman, "Rare Earths: Future Elements of Conflict in Asia?,” Asian Studies 
Review 37, no. 2 (June 2013): 235.  
24 Ibid., 235.  
25 Ibid., 240 
26 Ibid., 240  
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reforms on the Senkaku Islands dispute.27 A major component of the impact on military 
development is the constitutional reforms taking place under the administration of 
Primer Minister Shinzo Abe. In the immediate aftermath of World War II, Japan 
adopted a constitution that reduced its military to a purely defensive force called the 
Japanese Self Defense Force (JSDF). However, under Prime Minister Abe’s 
administration, there has been a push to adjust the constitution to permit the JSDF to 
operate with more leeway, even to the point of repealing Article 5 in the Japanese 
Constitution, which prevents the JSDF from engaging in an offensive war. Despite the 
fact that Abe has not been able to repeal this article, he has successfully been able to 
adjust the Constitution to allow Japan to engage in defensive conflicts alongside of 
Japan’s allies. Additionally, Japan’s military has also made material developments, 
including obtaining Izumo class helicopter carriers and new submarines.28 Along with 
this are new aviation assets the Lockheed Martin F-35 Lightning IIs and the Bell MV-22 
Ospreys.29 These new acquisitions demonstrate Japan’s desire to have an increasingly 
forward presence in the East China Sea. This forward presence, coupled with China’s 
similarly advanced presence in the East China Sea, could lead to greater conflict.  
 As Japan and China respond to each other’s growing assertive presence in the 
East China Sea, it should be noted that their actions have potential to draw in other 
actors, which may not necessarily be in the region. To this end, other scholars focused 
on the relationship between the United States and Japan and how that factors into the 
Senkaku Islands dispute. This approach is noted in Christopher Hughes’ article on 
                                                        
27 J. Miller Berkshire, “Abe’s Gambit: Japan Reorients Its Defense Posture,” World Affairs 176, no. 6 
(2016): 55. 
28 Sarosh Bana, "Sea Power," World Affairs 178, no. 3 (2015): 49. 
29 J. Miller Berkshire, “Abe’s Gambit: Japan Reorients Its Defense Posture,” 57. 
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Japan’s response to the rise of China.30 Due to the change in China’s power (specifically 
in that it is increasingly less restricted in its room to maneuver due to its growth in 
power) Japan’s traditional forms of engagement with China are failing to elicit a positive 
response. Consequently, Japan is forced to hedge its approach, incorporating more 
traditional and softer approaches with a harder and more martial way forward. Due to 
the fact that this hedged approach could draw in other partners to Japan, such as the 
United States, this approach is especially important to consider in relation to the side 
effects of the territorial dispute.  
 Further scholars have suggested that the East China Sea dispute impacts the 
relationship in how it influences changes in the regional order throughout the East China 
Sea region. Some argue that instead of the economic or territorial factors being the 
primary driver of the dispute, the articulation of a new regional order is what is driving 
the conflict between the PRC and Japan.31 Yoshihara argues that with Japan’s position 
in maritime Northeast Asia, the PRC is constrained by the fact that Japan sits astride the 
access points that China must use to reach the Pacific Ocean from the East China Sea, 
forcing it to seek control of these routes.32 Also, scholars emphasize the decline of 
Japanese maritime assets and how Japan has tried to respond to the dispute to address 
this imbalance.33 This regional rebalancing also draws in the United States, due to its 
heavy involvement in Japan’s security architecture.  
                                                        
30 Christopher W. Hughes, “Japan's Military Modernisation: A Quiet Japan-China Arms Race and Global 
Power Projection,” Asia-Pacific Review 16, no. 1 (2009): 1. 
31 Toshi Yoshihara, “Troubled Waters: China and Japan Face Off at Sea,” World Affairs 176, no. 5 (2014): 
24.  
32 Ibid., 25. 
33 Ibid., 25. 
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 An additional suggested area examined by scholars at this time is the role of 
military development in the region, especially with the role of Japan. In particular, some 
argue that with the rise of the PLAN and People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) 
in the region, the Japanese government should enhance the development of its navy, the 
Japanese Maritimes Self Defense Force (JMSDF) and its air force, the Japanese Air Self 
Defense Force (JASDF) to preserve its territory in the region.34 Additionally, some 
scholars advocate for cooperation with the PRC in the military sphere to help prevent 
issues around the Senkaku Islands. To this end, there are some who that Japan must 
work closely with the Chinese military to prevent any crises in the future, such as 
cooperation between the Japan Self Defense Forces (JSDF) and the PLA in UN 
peacekeeping operations.35 
 Another aspect of the East China Sea dispute as it impacts the military 
development is the Japanese Constitution itself. With the election of Shinzo Abe to a 
second term as Prime Minister of Japan, a major reform that was promoted was to alter 
Article 9 in the Japanese Constitution, which removes Japan’s option to use offensive 
warfare in the event of a conflict, especially in coalition conflicts.36 Due to the fact that 
such a vote requires a two-thirds in the Japanese Diet for approval to be changed, there 
are other options that Japan is evaluating in light of the East China Sea dispute, such as 
using a reinterpretation of the Japanese Constitution to give the JSDF more room to 
operate on military issues, including the Senkaku Islands dispute.37 Along with the                                                         
34 Noboru Yamaguchi. "The Sino–Japanese Relationship and Its Implications for Regional Security in 
East Asia." American Foreign Policy Interests 37, no. 5 (2015): 293.  
35 Ibid., 293.  
36 Yuichi Hosoya, “Japan’s New Security Legislation: What Does this Mean to East Asian Security?”, 
American Foreign Policy Interests 37, no. 5 (2015): 301.  
37 J. Berkshire Miller, “Abe’s Gambit: Japan Reorients its Defense Posture,” World Affairs 176, no. 6 
(2014): 56.  
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option for constitutional reform, Abe also created and Panel on Collective Self Defense. 
This panel has proposed a number of changes to Japan’s security architecture, including 
a new national security council, and expanded roles for the Japanese military overseas.38 
Also, the National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG) of 2013 also expanded on this, 
and included provisions for military equipment and the organization of the JSDF, to 
include F-35 Lightning IIs and MV-22 Osprey tiltrotors.39 
 In the recent decades, multiple scholars considered the role of military 
modernization as well. To some, the development of military has historical dimensions 
for Japan itself. Indeed, following the Sino-Japanese Treaty of Friendship’s adoption in 
the 1978 and up until the present, Japan gradually created a harder military hedge to 
fend off military challenges related to the dispute.40 This consists of developments in the 
way of military technology, and the creation of a robust alliance network to aid Japan in 
the defense of its territories.41 Some writers have also examined how Japan has 
developed its military under recent policies by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, especially in 
how it seeks to enhance its relationship with the US military.42 This development 
continues with the evolution of the Senkaku Islands dispute. 
Methodology 
 The analysis of this paper examines the history of the Senkaku Islands from 1895 
to the present. Using academic and primary sources, the paper will begin by looking at a 
history of the dispute in across successive periods of its history from the beginning of 
Japan’s confirmed administration of the island in 1895. These eras in the dispute’s                                                         
38 Ibid., 56.  
39 Ibid., 57.  
40 Jeffrey Hornung, “Japan’s Growing Hard Hedge Against China,” Asian Security 10, no. 2 (2014): 98. 
41 Ibid., 98. 
42 J. Berkshire Miller, “Abe’s Gambit: Japan Reorients its Defense Posture,” 58.  
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history are from 1895 to 1978, from 1978 to 1997, and from 1997 to the present. This 
will be done to provide historic context to the dispute, especially in setting the 
foundation for the modern era of the Senkaku Islands dispute. Additionally, these eras in 
the history of the dispute reflect fundamental changes in the militarization of the dispute. 
In the era between 1895 and 1971, the dispute itself was largely nonexistent, and Japan’s 
ownership and use of the islands went undisputed by China. Between 1971 and 1997, 
the Senkaku Islands became more economically important to the PRC, and accordingly 
the PRC became somewhat more vocal in its stance of the islands. This shift in the 
PRC’s views on the Senkaku Islands dispute coincided with the discovery of oil in the 
East China Sea around the islands. More importantly, this era reflects the current dispute 
as rooted in economic concerns from its outset, specifically in the resources around the 
Senkaku Islands. Additionally, the beginning of this era (in 1978) was marked by Japan 
and the PRC putting the resolution of the dispute off into the future in favor of 
normalizing and strengthening Sino-Japanese ties, showing that while important, ending 
the dispute in favor of other concerns. After 1980, events would transpire that would 
shape the dispute with respect to its direction. With the promulgation of UNCLOS and 
in particular its definition on the 200 nautical mile (nm) radius for islands and access to 
resources in that radius, the dispute became firmly fixed on the control of resources 
around the islands. Additionally, with the advent of a more economically and militarily 
powerful PRC in the 1980s would come a more assertive approach to promoting 
Chinese claims to the islands, as seen in the passage of the PRC’s Territorial Waters 
Law. That the Territorial Waters Law declared that the PRC would expel invaders from 
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Chinese territory represented a new approach to how the PRC would handle the Senkaku 
Islands dispute.  
 In the time between 1997 and the present, the dispute took on further new 
dimensions. Civilian activists from both Japan and the PRC took to boats to sail to the 
islands and promote claims for their respective countries. Additionally, both the 
governments of Japan and the PRC linked the Senkaku Islands and their history together 
in more overt and publicly available forms, which was a part of a wider wave of 
nationalism that fueled tensions between the two sides. Additionally, resource gathering 
from the surrounding seabed continued to factor into the dispute, albeit with new 
dimensions added into the mix, including seeking rare earth minerals essential to fueling 
the economies of the PRC and Japan. Ultimately, these tensions have led to an update in 
military strategies and technologies focused on a conflict in the vicinity of the Senkaku 
Islands.  
History From 1895 to 1978 
 The Senkaku Islands contain 8 features in total, specifically holding five islands 
and three rocks.43 These islands are located in the East China Sea near the PRC, Taiwan, 
and Japan. Specifically, the Senkaku Islands are 170 kilometers northwest of the 
Japanese island of Ishigaki and 170 kilometers north of Taiwan.44 Additionally, the 
islands are 330 kilometers southeast of the PRC, and 410 kilometers west of the 
Japanese island of Okinawa.45 The islands in the archipelago are not particularly 
                                                        
43 Alexandra Dan, "Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands -- Landmark In Redefining the Power Politics In the East 
China Sea," Strategic Impact 60, no. 4 (2016): 20.  
44 Paul J. Smith, “Senkaku Islands Controversy: A Crisis Postponed,” Naval War College Review 66, no. 2 
(2013): 29.  
45  Alexandra Dan, "Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands -- Landmark In Redefining the Power Politics In the East 
China Sea," 20.  
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sizeable themselves. The largest island, Uotsuri or Diaoyu Dao, has an area of 2.3 
kilometers and at its highest point is 383 meters above sea level.46 
 The Senkaku Islands have a long and particularly tenuous history between PRC 
and Japan. The divisive nature of the Senkaku Islands dispute is reflected in the 
territorial claims that PRC and Japan each have for the islands. From the perspective of 
the PRC and the Republic of China (ROC) on Taiwan, the islands have belonged to 
China since 1534, when the Ming Dynasty administered the islands.47 However, the 
Japanese government articulates that the islands were unclaimed when initially 
discovered and that presently, there is no dispute. Indeed, the Japanese government 
asserts that the islands are Japanese territory, and that no dispute over the islands 
exists.48 However, the claims of the PRC, ROC, and Japan regarding when which state 
controlled the Senkaku Islands similarly conflict with the respective claims of each state 
involved. Rather, both the PRC and the ROC claim that the Senkaku Islands were not 
gained by Japan until the signing of the Treaty of Shimonoseki, which concluded the 
Sino-Japanese War in 1895.49 In this treaty, China relinquished a large quantity of its 
territory, including “Formosa, together with all islands appertaining or belonging to the 
said island of Formosa.”50 This line in the treaty is the lynchpin of the PRC and ROC’s 
argument to support their claims to the Senkaku Islands, specifically on when they 
surrendered control of the islands to Japan. The Japanese government states that 
although Japan has maintained control of the islands since 1895, the Senkaku Islands 
where not obtained by conquest. Rather, the Japanese government maintains that they                                                         
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gained control of the Senkaku Islands through use the principle of terra nullius, finding 
that the islands were unclaimed.51 This status was disputed by China, claiming that since 
the Ming Dynasty then ruling China administered the Senkaku Islands, that there was 
nothing to claim.52 
 The Japanese government would maintain control of the islands until the 
conclusion of World War II. At that point, the United States took control of the islands 
as part of its occupation. Indeed, the United States had the right to “the right to exercise 
all and any powers of administration, legislation and jurisdiction over the territory and 
inhabitants of these islands, including their territorial waters.”53 During the United States 
occupation, the islands rarely caused tensions between Japan and the newly born PRC, 
as the islands were not considered as particularly valuable.54 This administration of the 
islands would continue past the end of the occupation for most of Japan. This mainly 
occurred as a result of the fact that the Ryukyu Islands (which the Senkaku Islands was 
administered as a component of the Ryukyu Islands) were not returned by the United 
States to Japan until 1972.55 Since the American occupation forces administered the 
Senkaku Islands as part of its mandate in the Ryukyu Islands, the Senkaku Islands would 
revert to Japanese control.  
  In the following fifteen years, the Senkaku Islands rose to further prominence as 
a source of tensions between the PRC and Japan. This newfound notability can be 
attributed to two factors. First, in 1968, there was an energy survey of the East China                                                         
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Sea conducted by the Committee for the Coordination of Joint Prospecting for Mineral 
Resources in Asian Offshore Areas under the United Nations (UN).56 This survey found 
the possibility of the presence of sizeable energy reserves in the vicinity of the islands. 
An additional cause that sparked new interest in the Senkaku Islands was the territorial 
status of Japanese territories in and around the Ryukyu Islands. In 1968, the United 
States and Japan were beginning the negotiation of the reversion of the Ryukyu Islands 
to the jurisdiction of Japan, with plans to have the reversion take place by 1972.57 This 
handover of territory also impacted the Senkaku Islands, which would also revert to 
complete Japanese sovereignty.  
  These discoveries prompted responses from communist government on the 
mainland of China and the Guomindang led government of the Republic of China 
(ROC) on Taiwan. For instance, Taiwan’s ambassador to the United States, Chou Shu-
Kai, presented a memorandum detailing why the ROC disputed Japan’s claims to the 
islands.58 Even Communist government of the mainland based People’s Republic of 
China (PRC), despite its historic animosity to the Guomindang government in Taipei, 
supported the ROC’s stance. To this end, the PRC, through its state operated Xinhua 
news outlet, echoed that the Senkaku Islands belonged to Taiwan, and in turn the PRC 
itself.59 This pressure that was put forth extended beyond Japan itself. Indeed, the 
pressure exerted on the United States by Chinese populations both in East Asia and in 
the United States helped force the United States to adopt a neutral stance on the Senkaku 
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Islands in 1971, even as they returned total administration of the Senkaku Islands with 
the remaining Japanese home territories in the Ryukyu Islands that were controlled by 
the United States armed forces.60 As will be noted later, this neutral stance only regards 
the territorial dispute itself, since the Mutual Security Treaty that binds the United States 
to protect Japanese territory in the event of war was extended to protect the Senkaku 
Islands from aggressive actions.  
  With the spike in tensions regarding the Senkaku Islands, Japan and the PRC 
began multiple sets of negotiations in order to resolve the territorial dispute. These 
negotiations came with the broader negotiations between the PRC and Japan to 
normalize relations, culminating with a visit to the PRC by Japanese Prime Minister 
Kakuei Tanaka.61 The first set of negotiations began in 1972, but was impeded by the 
fact that both sides could not forge a compromise. The negotiations were complicated by 
the fact that at the outset of the year, the PRC reasserted its claim that the Senkaku 
Islands were only transferred to Japan in 1895 after the defeat of the Qing Dynasty in the 
Sino-Japanese War, and that the Senkaku Islands had belonged to China since the late 
Ming Dynasty.62 Both the PRC and Japan held to their respective positions throughout 
the negotiations. However, during the negotiations, both the PRC and Japan realized 
they were not going to shift from their positions.63 Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai decided 
to downplay the seriousness of the impasse by pointing to the fact that the Senkaku 
Islands were rather miniscule in size, and the Chinese government decided to put the 
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resolution of the territorial dispute back for later years.64 However, those future years 
would arrive much sooner than what was expected by the negotiators in 1972.  
 That future year for the next generation of diplomats to return to turned out to be 
1978. Although there was a desire to negotiate a more stable treaty, there were elements 
in the Japanese government that sough to stop the signing of the treaty. The dispute over 
the islands escalated in relation to the negotiations for the 1978 Sino-Japanese Treaty of 
Friendship. The anti-treaty LDP members attempted to leverage the Senkaku Islands 
dispute to stop the ratification of the treaty. This attempt to use the Senkaku Islands 
dispute gained a great amount of support even up to the ruling cabinet, as Agriculture 
and Forestry Minister Nakagawa Ichiro supported the opposition to the treaty and helped 
spearhead efforts to thwart the signing of the treaty.65 Soon after these public shows of 
displeasure by the LDP members opposed to the signing of the treaty, an incursion of a 
flotilla of 140 Chinese fishing vessels, including some armed, departed several ports in 
the PRC and entered the 12-mile territorial limits around the Senkaku Islands, which led 
to a decline in Sino-Japanese relations after the flotilla departed four days later.66 Even 
as the flotilla of fishing vessels still lingered in the environs of the Senkaku Islands, 
Japanese Prime Minister Takeo Fukuda elected to continue forward with the negotiation 
and signing of the treaty. To this end, Fukuda enacted stronger controls of how cabinet 
members should respond to the dispute in public, to the point of positioning himself as 
the arbiter of how and what mentions of the Senkaku Islands territorial dispute were 
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made by his fellow cabinet members.67 These controls ultimately helped lead to the 
resumption of negotiations between Japan and the PRC.  
 With the flotilla incursion and attempts by LDP members to stop the signing of 
the Sino-Japanese Friendship Treaty remaining in recent memory, negotiations between 
China and Japan resumed in July 1978.68 In this set of negotiations, the Senkaku Islands 
dispute became a secondary matter to the wider negotiations pursuing normalized Sino-
Japanese relations. For the Japanese, particularly the government of Prime Minister 
Takeo Fukuda, the treaty provided a certain level of stability for his government. Fukuda 
was pinned by two factions in his Liberal Democrat Party (LDP)- a pro-Taiwan faction 
and a pro-Soviet faction that opposed the treaty.69 Coupled with the fact that Fukuda 
lacked a broad based of support across the LDP, the pro-Taiwan and pro-Soviet factions 
in the LDP forced Fukuda to pursue the 1978 Sino-Japanese Treaty in order to secure his 
position in the LDP.70 The role of the 1978 treaty with respects to Fukuda’s position in 
the LDP played a more specific role in the LDP along with the Fukuda’s general level of 
support. Indeed, the LDP’s presidential election was slated for November 1978, and 
Fukuda hoped to enhance his position in the party vis-à-vis his nearest rival in the party, 
Ohira Masayoshi, who was himself gaining popularity in the run up to the LDP’s 
election.71 
  For Japan, foreign policy elements other than the Senkaku Islands also played a 
role in its calculations during the 1978 negotiations. As previously mentioned, Prime 
Minister Kakuei Tanaka previously normalized Japan’s relations with China during the                                                         
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negotiations in 1972. With this in mine, Fukuda hoped that the 1978 treaty could be used 
to improve Japan’s position to benefit economically from the normalization of relations 
with China.72 Coupled with this, Fukuda hoped to expand Japanese influence over 
Chinese communities residing in ASEAN countries to gain new economic markets for 
Japan.73 These foreign policy elements influenced Japan’s outlook on the negotiations 
and what they hoped to gain from them.  
 For its part, China also had considerable internal concerns for the negotiations. 
The major concern was rooted in the Fifth National People’s Congress of March 1978. 
At the congress, the delegates articulated a plan to bolster the PRC’s economy as Deng 
Xiaoping ascended to power.74 In the eyes of some in the PRC, with Japan as a new ally, 
the PRC would be in a much better position to advance itself in the domestic sphere. 
Indeed, the Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), Hua Guofeng, stated that 
“since the normalization of relations, contacts and exchanges have been growing in 
many fields and a long-term trade agreement was recently signed.”75 This statement 
clearly reflects the level of economic importance that China placed in invigorating its 
ties with Japan, as well as the hopes in the PRC’s eyes of Japans future place as an 
economic ally.  
 Additionally, like Japan, the PRC also had foreign policy concerns as well. One 
aspect was to address the recent Soviet-Vietnamese alliance. To the PRC, the Soviet-
Vietnamese alliance was a veritable pincer aimed at harming the PRC that could 
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possibly be offset by the PRC’s interactions with Japan.76 Additionally, the PRC also 
had territorial claims in other areas that it wanted to solidify its claims to. For example, 
the PRC focused much of its attentions on the territorial disputes to northeast Asia 
(specifically with North and South Korea), as those disputes potentially involved 
massive oil reserves at stake.77 Additionally, there was a historical component to the 
nature of the PRC’s foreign policy motivations in the negotiation of the 1978 Sino-
Japanese Treaty of Friendship. In this light, the PRC sought to negotiate and sign a 
binding treaty with Japan, especially after the shared pasts with Japan colonizing much 
of China in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.78 Furthermore, the end result of the 
treaty was a matter of national pride. Indeed, getting Japan to sign the treaty at all was 
quite remarkable for the PRC after much of the previous century was characterized by 
belligerent Sino-Japanese interactions.79 That Japan would sign the 1978 Sino-Japanese 
was in itself a boost to the PRC’s self esteem, as they were now concluding a treaty with 
a longtime rival and colonizer of much of China. 
  Eventually, despite the rising tensions due to the reemergence of the Senkaku 
Islands dispute in 1978, the Sino-Japanese Treaty of Friendship was negotiated and 
signed over the objections of the anti-treaty members of the Diet. One reason that this 
victory emerged was due to the fact that the pro-treaty Diet members in the LDP had 
gained enough support within its ranks to overcome any proposals that might counter the 
development of the Sino-Japanese Treaty of Friendship.80 Additionally, the PRC also 
played a role in pushing the treaty negotiations to a successful conclusion. Indeed, it is                                                         
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thought that the PRC deployment of fishing vessels to the islands, though seen as harsh, 
was aimed at pushing Japan to resume negotiations for the friendship treaty, despite the 
fact that this maneuver by Deng Xiaoping nearly failed.81 
 
Figure 2: “Signing the Sino-Japanese Treaty of Peace and Friendship,” China Daily, September 25, 2013. 
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/China-Japan-Relations/2013-09/25/content_16992761.htm  
  From this point, the negotiations for the Sino-Japanese treaty continued into a 
second round and eventually, the ratification of the treaty itself. The treaty itself would 
be signed in both the PRC and Japan (Figure 2). The 1978 Sino-Japanese treaty stated 
that it was made “for the purpose of solidifying and developing the relations of peace 
between the two countries [the PRC and Japan].”82 Despite this stated purpose of the 
treaty, a solution for the Senkaku Islands dispute would not be forthcoming in this 
treaty. Indeed, the Sino-Japanese treaty, like the attempt in 1972, pushed the 
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negotiations onto the shoulders of future generations.83 In fact, a resolution to the 
dispute was shelved in light of the fact that other political considerations were 
considered more important to bilateral ties between China and Japan. With both the PRC 
and Japan committing to this course of action, the dispute was given a chance to 
continue to play a role in the regional relations of the East China Sea.  
 History of the Senkaku Islands Dispute From 1978 to 1997 
  In the 1980s, the dispute entered a new stage in the legal sphere. In the realm of 
international law, the development of a United Nations convention that would govern 
conduct on the high seas would help play a role in shaping the complexity of the claims 
to the Senkaku Islands. This convention would be the United Nations Convention on the 
Laws of the Sea (UNCLOS), which was ratified in 1982.84 One major influence that 
UNCLOS would impart on the dispute was what defined islands. To UNCLOS, an 
island or rock that “cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of their own shall 
have no exclusive economic zone (EEZ) or continental shelf.”85 This aspect of the treaty 
is very important because of how it dictates how a state can control resources in a certain 
area around its island or islands.  
  For its part, the Senkaku Islands dispute is impact by these changes in the 
definitions of EEZs and continental shelves. Concerning the case of the Senkaku Islands, 
the fact that the Senkaku Islands allows for Japan to maintain an EEZ allows Japan to 
regulate and control resources within a 200 nautical mile radius.86 Additionally, the 
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matter of continental shelves also influences how territory is assessed with the case of 
the Senkaku Islands. Due to the fact that the continental shelves are used to define 
territory as it pertains to the seabed, the Senkaku Islands form a critical part of Japan’s 
definition for its territorial shelf.87 The additions of definitions for EEZs and continental 
shelf underscore the importance of the Senkaku Islands dispute as it impacts the 
territorial boundaries and economic matters of the PRC and Japan.  
  The change in the definition for continental shelves had a major impact for Japan 
in its stance on the Senkaku Islands. One aspect that has been influenced by UNCLOS is 
the defining the baseline for the continental shelf. In 1982, because of a fear of 
technological measures used to expand the baseline, Japan supported using a uniform 
baseline to measure continental shelves to ensure equitable boundaries.88 Another area 
that impacted Japan’s stance on the continental shelves is how other states should record 
these boundaries according to continental shelves. Japan argued that using the principle 
of equidistance, states could determine among themselves how to address the definitions 
of adjacent continental shelves.89 These ties influence the role continental shelves play 
in Japan’s stance.  
  At this time, the PRC’s stance on the new regime for continental shelves is also 
important to consider. In contrast to Japan, the PRC was opposed to the notion of states 
working together to delineate the continental shelf boundaries. Rather, the PRC 
supported the use of international law to support attempts at marking the boundaries of 
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continental shelves.90 Additionally, the PRC also rejects the principle of natural 
prolongation. To this end, the seabed that extends 200 nautical miles that is include in 
the EEZ is considered by the PRC as a violation of international law.91 This highlights 
the influences that the territorial disputes have had on the view of continental shelves.  
 The Senkaku Islands dispute continued to linger in the background of East Asian 
foreign relations throughout the next fourteen years after the formation and enactment of 
UNCLOS in 1982. However, after the end of the Cold War in 1991, the Senkaku Islands 
dispute reemerged as an ongoing and major dispute. Early signs of the Senkaku Islands 
return to prominence as a major international dispute quickly became apparent in the 
immediate year after the end of the Cold War in 1991. Indeed, in 1992, the PRC crafted 
and introduced a Territorial Waters Law, which enshrined the PRC’s claims to the 
Senkaku Islands along with the PRC’s claims to the Spratly and Paracel Islands in the 
South China Sea.92 This law also codified how the PRC should reply to military units 
that did not follow the measures of innocent passage in the claimed maritime areas or 
airspace of the PRC. According to the Territorial Waters Law, the PRC reserved the 
right to “order it to leave the territorial sea immediately and the flag State shall bear 
international responsibility for any loss or damage thus caused.”93 Promulgating the 
Territorial Waters Law with this kind of language in it underscored the tensions that 
would emerge from the Senkaku Islands dispute in the coming decades.  
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 The Senkaku Islands dispute would continue to flare up throughout the 1990s 
after the promulgation of the Territorial Waters Law in the PRC. At first, the initial 
incidents were somewhat subsurface in its visibility and impact compared to what was to 
come ahead. In 1995, two Japanese Air Self Defense Force (JASDF) McDonnell 
Douglas F-4 Phantom IIs were scrambled to successfully ward off a duo of Chinese 
Sukhoi fighter aircraft that were heading toward the islands.94 In 1996, the dispute 
escalated significantly, returning tensions over the Senkaku Islands dispute to heights 
unseen since the 1970s. One aspect of this was the ratification of UNCLOS by the 
Japanese Diet. With this ratification, the Japanese government declared a 200 nautical 
mile EEZ around its territory, including the Senkaku Islands. In addition, activists from 
both the PRC and Japan started to actually approach the islands directly.95 This action 
led to a renewed start of the dispute.  
 Activists from both the PRC and Japan also played an active role in this era of 
the dispute. In July 1996, Japanese right wring activists from Nihon Seinensha landed on 
the islands to build a lighthouse (Fig. 3).  
 
Figure 3: “Japanese Raise Flags on Diaoyutais” Taipei Times, August 20, 2015,  
http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2012/08/20/2003540723                                                         
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 This action sparked protests from activists based in the PRC who supported the 
PRC’s claims to the islands. Activists who supported the PRC’s position also attempted 
to make their way to the island, embarking from Hong Kong before being turned away 
by the Japanese Coast Guard.96 The presence of activists also did not go without harm to 
the activists themselves. In fact, this first set of protests was marked by the death of an 
activist in September 1996 who attempted to swim to one of the islands.97 The death of 
the activist was followed by a massive candlelight vigil in Hong Kong attended by 
thousands, which was followed by a new flotilla to the Senkaku Islands.98 In this next 
flotilla, protestors actually were able to land on Uotsuri Island. After doing this, they 
planted PRC flags that were later removed by Okinawan officials.99 
 These protests would mark the initiation of the protestors and their role in the 
crisis. In 1997, a city assemblyman from Ishigaki landed on the islands with a Japanese 
reporter from the Sankei Shimbun, sparking regret from the Japanese government over 
the incident.100 Such protests or perceived inflammatory actions by Japanese activists 
and politicians who supported measures that supported the Japanese claims to the 
Senkaku Islands were countered by counter protests by PRC activists. While most PRC 
activists attempted to navigate to the Senkaku Islands by sea, one notable but failed 
attempt that PRC activists attempted to utilize was an attempt to perform a parachute 
landing onto the Senkaku Islands from a plane departing from Subic International 
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Airport in the Philippines.101 Ultimately, the activists’ attempts to avoid Japanese ships 
from below failed as the plane suffered a mechanical failure while in flight and was 
forced to return to Subic International Airport.102 Although this attempt at an aerial 
approach to landing on the Senkaku Islands failed, it was indicative of the great tension 
that the dispute had returned to after 1996.  
History of the Senkaku Islands Dispute from 1998 to the Present 
 After the 1997 incidents, the dispute would continue to reach levels of greater 
intensity in East Asia, although it would remain much more present on the stage of East 
Asian affairs than in the aftermath of past disputes. Over the next eight years, the dispute 
continued to emerge on multiple occasions. One aspect of this was the actual leasing of 
the Senkaku Islands. Up to this point, a Japanese private citizen had owned the Senkaku 
Islands. However, in 2003, the Japanese government leased land on three of the Senkaku 
Islands, after renting the islands from that private owner earlier in 2003.103 In this 
instance of protests, it was clear that the Japanese government intended to maintain its 
presence on the Senkaku Islands. To this end, the Japanese government sought to renew 
the 22 million year lease to its portion of the islands.104 These new attempts at leasing 
the islands went far in sparking continued protests.  
 Additionally, economic concerns would also rise to forefront in this era. In this 
moment of great intensity, increased competition over the resources in the areas 
surrounding the Senkaku Islands would rise to the forefront. In 2004, the China National 
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Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) announced that it began its cultivation of the 
Chunxiao Oil Field, an oil field that is located approximately four kilometers from the 
edge of Japan’s EEZ around the Senkaku Islands.105 The dispute over this field has been 
particularly tense, due primarily to its location close to Japan’s EEZ around the Senkaku 
Islands. Indeed, the proximity that the Chunxiao Oil Field (referred as the Shirakaba Oil 
Field in Japan) enjoys in relation the Senkaku Islands coupled with the potential 
resources in the field resulted in both sides disputing the ownership and cultivation 
rights of the oil field.106 However, this aspect of the dispute would be resolved. Indeed, 
in 2008, the Japanese and Chinese governments signed an agreement to jointly extract 
the resources in the Chunxiao oilfield following four years of talks over the fields.107 
This has marked a rare moment of concessions in this most recent era of the dispute.  
 Another important aspect of the dispute in recent times regarding the 
development of the economic resources in the vicinity of the Senkaku Islands is the 
development of rare earth minerals in the seabed in the EEZ around the Senkaku Islands. 
For both the PRC and Japan, the importance of rare earth minerals cannot be overstated 
enough. For China, rare earth minerals are an important element of their economic 
advancements following Deng Xiaoping’s rise to power in 1978. By 1990, rare earth 
minerals were recognized as a strategic asset by the PRC’s government.108 At this time, 
the highest levels of the PRC’s leadership recognized the vital importance of rare earth 
minerals to the PRC’s economy and other strategic endeavors. This notice of the critical 
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role of rare earth minerals by the PRC leadership was best noted by the a statement 
ascribed to Deng Xiaoping, who stated at a speech in Baotou in the province of Inner 
Mongolia that “the Middle East has oil, China has rare earths.”109 This importance has 
been extended to the present by China, who has since surpassed the United States as the 
leading producer of rare earth minerals in the world.110 
 For Japan, the control of rare earth minerals is also an important matter 
nationally. However, unlike China, Japan is extremely dependent on imports to 
accomplish its economic goals with rare earth minerals. In fact, because of the high 
technology that forms a main bulwark of Japan’s economy, Japan’s 2010 imports of rare 
earth minerals constituted over half of the world’s consumption of rare earth minerals.111 
Moreover, Japan is also highly dependent on China’s exports of rare earth minerals in 
particular. With the rise in the PRC as the primary supplier of rare earth minerals for 
much of the world’s needs, Japan has found the need to seek out alternative supply 
options for rare earth minerals. During a flare up of the Senkaku Islands dispute in 2010, 
Japanese Prime Minister Naoto Kan was able to secure an agreement with his Indian 
counterpart, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh to explore future cooperation on rare 
earth mineral extraction in India, which lead to major agreements establishing an Indo-
Japanese extraction facility in India and exploration of Indian rare earth mineral 
deposits.112 Although Japan had some successes in diversifying its supply of rare earth 
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minerals, the angst-ridden relationship with the PRC regarding the Senkaku Islands 
would still persist in hindering Japan’s ability to import rare earth minerals.  
 In 2010, there was a significant spike in tensions over the Senkaku Islands. In 
this instance, the escalation of tension was sparked by an incident between a Chinese 
trawler and a Japan Coast Guard vessel. In the incident, a Chinese trawler rammed a 
Japan Coast Guard vessel JCG Mizuki after bumping another Japanese ship, the JCG 
Yonakuni.113 Following the collision, the Japanese coast guard vessels stopped the 
Chinese trawler and arrested its captain.114 Following the incident, the Japanese 
government, specifically the Foreign Ministry issued a statement regarding the incident. 
In the statement, the Japanese Foreign Ministry reasserted Japan’s claims to the islands 
and rejected the PRC’s demands for an apology and financial reparations as “completely 
groundless and unacceptable for Japan.”115 However, China retaliated by aiming directly 
for Japan’s need for rare earth mineral imports to maintain its economic vitality. To this 
end, Beijing replied to the fishing captain’s arrest by enacting a temporary ban on rare 
earth mineral exports to Japan.116 Additionally, the move to arrest the captain of the 
fishing vessel was met with anti- Japanese protests across the PRC.117 Ultimately, this 
pressure from the PRC forced Japan down from its own stance. Later, Japan released the 
captain of the fishing vessel, prompting considerable criticism from members of Japan’s 
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Diet and public. Despite the resolution, the economic aspects of the conflict continued to 
influence the tensions in the dispute.  
 Even as the economic aspects of this dispute continued to serve as the root of 
tensions, the dispute was fueled by nationalism surrounding the dispute. This new wave 
of nationalist fervor was fueled by a significant increase in Japan’s ownership stake to 
the Senkaku Islands. Specifically, the islands were purchased from their private owner in 
2012. Despite the fact that the islands were purchased in 2012, there were earlier 
discussions of purchasing the islands by the Japanese government. Indeed, Prime 
Minister Yoshihiko Noda considered buying the islands as early as 2010 due to concerns 
over the PRC’s increased military presence around the Senkaku Islands.118 Moreover, 
Prime Minister Noda also wanted to find a way to send a message regarding to deter any 
Chinese military occupation of the islands. 119 However, Noda was concerned about a 
vitriolic response from the PRC if the Japanese government acquired the islands. To 
avoid the likely belligerent response from the PRC, Noda intended to clandestinely 
purchase the islands with little ceremony.120 However, this attempt at a covert purchase 
of the Senkaku Islands would be thwarted another party in Japan who was interested in 
purchasing the islands.  
 That party who was interested in the purchase of the Senkaku Islands was 
Governor Shintaro Ishihara, the governor of Tokyo Prefecture. Before Prime Minister 
Noda’s government could implement a plan to obtain the islands, Governor Ishihara 
announced a plan to purchase the islands in 2012. Governor Ishihara argued that the                                                         
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move for the Tokyo Prefecture to purchase the islands was necessary, for the Ishihara 
declared that “the central government is too scared to do anything"121 to resolve the 
dispute in Japan’s favor. Governor Ishihara’s move to begin the negotiation of the 
purchase the islands caught the national government completely by off guard. After 
debating a reaction, Prime Minister Noda elected to purchase the Senkaku Islands. The 
government negotiated successfully for the islands, paying 2.5 million yen for the 
islands.122 
 The purchase was extremely controversial in both Japan and the PRC. In the 
PRC, although the PRC’s government was slow to respond, it soon replied in a strong 
way. Indeed, the then President of the PRC, Hu Jintao, confronted Prime Minister Noda 
at the Asia Pacific Corporation meeting, warning him that nationalizing the islands 
would be considered as a an illegal action.123 Additionally, the move to nationalize the 
islands sparked major anti-Japanese protests in China. The protests took place across on 
September 18, the anniversary of the Mukden Incident in 1931, which was used as a 
pretext by the Imperial Japanese government to invade Manchuria.124 At a broader level, 
history was used to underpin the protests. According to pictures distributed by PRC state 
news agency Xinhua, some signs included messages such as “Don’t Forget National 
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Humiliation.”125 To the PRC, the action to nationalize the islands tapped into deep set 
feelings in the PRC that have intertwined nationalist fervor and China’s history.  
 Coupled with the protests, the language used by the governments of Japan and 
the PRC became progressively more militarized. After 2012, this was furthered by new 
changes in Japanese and Chinese politics. In Japan, the more rapid changeover of new 
cabinets that began after the crash of the Japanese economy in the 1990s was ended by a 
new administration led by the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). This new cabinet, under 
Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, took a more nationalist stance on the Senkaku Islands, 
reflecting the more right wing stance of the LDP at this time. Even before he assumed 
his seat as prime minister, Shinzo Abe announced, “the Senkaku group is Japanese 
territory and, in the eyes of the international community, belongs to Japan and is 
effectively controlled by us. On this point, there is no room for negotiation.”126 
Additionally, before assuming his new role, Prime Minister elect Abe also criticized the 
administration of the preceding Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ). Abe argued that the 
DPJ had harmed Sino-Japanese ties and that Japan should "We need to deepen our ties 
with the rest of Asia, including India and Australia, not only in diplomacy but also in 
security and energy. In that context, we look at the importance of ties with the Chinese. 
Only the LDP can take such a strategic approach."127 In this way, there was a marked 
sea change in the political basis that created a stronger stance against the PRC over the 
issue of the islands. Moreover, it marked an end to an attempt at fostering closer ties 
with the PRC that had been carried forward by the DPJ.  
                                                        
125 Ibid.  
126 “Abe Talks Tough: Senkaku Islands Belong to Japan,” Straits Times Dec. 18, 2012. LexisNexis 
Academic. 
127 Ibid.  
 39 
 From the PRC, there were other ways that the dispute became more militarized, 
as seen in staking certain and provocative claims in the context of the dispute. One 
major source of this militarization was a declaration of an Air Defense Identification 
Zone (ADIZ) over the East China Sea (Fig. 4). In declaring the ADIZ, the PRC sought 
to promote its claims to the Senkaku Islands. Specifically, it sought to assert its presence 
in current and claimed portions that the PRC claimed for its EEZ in the vicinity of the 
Senkaku Islands.128 
 
Figure 4: Map of ADIZs in the East China Sea. Michael Green, Kathleen Hicks, Zack Cooper, John Schaus, 
and Jake Douglas, “CSIS Counter Coercion Series: East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone,” CSIS 
Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative. June 13, 2017, https://amti.csis.org/counter-co-east-china-sea-adiz/. 
  The establishment of the East China Sea ADIZ did not go without response. For Japan, 
that response consisted of a JASDF reconnaissance mission to the Senkaku Islands.129 
Additionally, Japan also continued its normal missions around the Senkaku Islands. 
Other states had their own responses. In the case of the United States, this emerged in 
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the form of a flight of two Boeing B-52 Stratofortress strategic bombers through the East 
China Sea ADIZ, without complying with the PRC’s new regime.130 
  During this time of tremendous strife in the Senkaku Islands dispute’s history, 
the development of the respective militaries of both the PRC and Japan has been enabled 
by this increase in tensions to improve their respective technologies and units, thus 
providing them with better tools to fight each other should a war arise over the islands. 
In the JSDF, advances have been made in improving the technology used in the possible 
defense of the Senkaku Islands. One example of this can be seen in advances made in 
the JASDF to match new advances made by the Chinese air arm, the People’s Liberation 
Army Air Force (PLAAF) in the latest fighter aircraft. In terms of fighter aircraft, the 
JASDF has introduced the first Lockheed Martin F-35 Lightning II aircraft into its 
inventory, with the first F-35 joining the JASDF at Misawa Air Base (AB) in Aomori 
Prefecture, Japan in January 2018.131 This acquisition is part of a wider JASDF initiative 
to field forty-two F-35s to replace older McDonnell Douglas F-4 Phantom IIs by 
2023.132 Additionally, the JSDF is also seeking transport aircraft that is faster and gifted 
with longer ranges to remain on station for longer periods of time. To this end, the 
Japanese Ground Self Defense Forces (JGSDF) has ordered Bell MV-22 Osprey to 
fulfill this requirement.133 With its greater range and speed coupled with the abilities of a 
helicopter, the Osprey gives the JSDF a more expedient way to deploy troops to the 
furthest reaches of its territory in the East China Sea, including the Senkaku Islands.                                                          
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  In terms of adjusting for naval technology and units, the JSDF has also made 
certain adjustments to account for increased tensions with the PRC over the Senkaku 
Islands. In particular, JMSDF has made a major drive for the development of aircraft 
carrier like helicopter destroyers that would allow Japan to deploy naval based forces in 
the surrounding region faster than currently allowed. Currently, the JMSDF is preparing 
to field two Izumo class helicopter destroyers alongside the currently active JS Hyuga 
and her sister ship JS Ise.134 Besides working to improve its capabilities in rapid naval 
deployment, the JMSDF also looked to grow its submarine force from sixteen 
submarines to twenty-two submarines.135 Along with these advances in the JMSDF, the 
JGSDF also has made contributions to maritime advances. In 2018, the JGSDF stood up 
the Amphibious Rapid Deployment Brigade (ARDB), which is Japan’s first active 
marine unit since World War II.136 Due to the advent of this new unit, Japan now has a 
specialist unit that can deploy for amphibious operations, including the defense of the 
Senkaku Islands.  
  The PLA has also made advances in technology to better prepare itself for a war 
in the East China Sea. One area for the PLAAF is increased use of PLAAF aircraft to fly 
over the East China Sea. Although the types and number of aircraft used have varied 
from incident to incident, particularly notable flights are the flyovers conducted by Xian 
H-6K strategic bombers over the disputed parts of the East China Sea.137 Moreover, the 
PLAAF has undergone doctrinal changes that impact its role in the East China Sea 
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disputes. Specifically, the PLAAF is charged with supporting fleet actions conducted by 
the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) in order to secure the East China Sea.138 
Here, it is apparent that even if the PLAAF is not the leading force involved in a conflict 
in the East China Sea, it is still placed in a major position.  
  The PLAN and the China Coast Guard (CCG) are also making their own 
adjustments to prepare themselves for a conflict in the East China Sea, in order to 
increase their presence and improve their naval skills. For example, PLAN ships in 2013 
circumnavigated the Japanese archipelago via the East China Sea.139 Additionally, like 
JMSDF, the PLAN is making a concentrated effort at improving their ability to project 
naval aviation into its near seas, a technique that would be in demand in a conflict in the 
East China Sea. To this end, the PLAN has already developed and fielded the former 
Soviet aircraft carrier Varyag, now known as the Liaoning, into an active carrier to 
develop Chinese doctrine on carrier aviation.140 Looking ahead, China has continued its 
development of aircraft carriers, launching an improved version of the Liaoning referred 
to as the Type 001A class.141 In the CCG, there has been continued development of 
improved coast guard vessels that are bigger in size. In 2013, the CCG fielded two new 
cutters, the Haijing 3401 and Haijing 2401, which have a weight of approximately four 
thousand tons.142 These vessels of increased size give the CCG greater capability in its 
abilities to operate in the East China Sea near the Senkaku Islands.   
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Implications of the Senkaku Islands Dispute  
 The Senkaku Islands dispute has evolved considerably over the years. From 1895 
to 1971, the Senkaku Islands was not a tremendous part of the foreign policy of China, 
and the dispute was nonexistent. From 1971 to 1997, the dispute over the islands 
transformed considerably. With the discovery of possible oil reserves in the East China 
Sea around the Senkaku Islands, the PRC became extremely assertive over the Senkaku 
Islands. Additionally, the dispute figured heavily in the Sino-Japanese negotiations to 
normalize relations. Although flare-ups in the dispute did hinder negotiations initially, 
the governments ultimately pushed back a peaceful conclusion to the dispute. Another 
major change that appeared was the change in the internationally accepted definition of 
the EEZ in UNCLOS. With the enshrinement of the 200 nm EEZ, this further reinforced 
that the dispute was rooted in the acquisition of resources around the islands themselves. 
Also, with the PRC’s growth in economic and military power came an adjustment in its 
stance over the islands. As the PRC’s power grew in the 1980s and 1990s, it started to 
renew and improve a more assertive stance on the dispute, as seen in law such as the 
Territorial Waters Law.  
 After 1997, the dispute would increase in intensity. At this time, nationalist 
fervor began to play a greater role in public discourse and action over the islands 
dispute. This role by the people of both the PRC and Japan began to manifest itself in 
civilian activists sailing to the Senkaku Islands and attempting to land on them, leaving 
flags and other markers to assert their respective country’s claims to the islands. 
Additionally, protests on both sides in the PRC and Japan have also come to play a large 
role in the dispute as it adds further the nationalist rhetoric surrounding the dispute. Still, 
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the original economic driver of the dispute- namely, the extraction of resources from the 
seabed- continues to push the dispute onward. Although the original resource of oil 
continues to factor into the dispute, other resources located in the waters and seabed 
around the Senkaku Islands entered the dispute, such as rare earth minerals. With the 
increase in the dispute’s intensity, there has been an increase in the creation and 
implementation of new strategies and technologies by the PLA and the JSDF to make 
use of in the event of an armed conflict over the Senkaku Islands.  
 There is high potential for a military conflict over the Senkaku Islands. One 
aspect of this is that both the economies of the PRC and Japan require the resources at 
stake in the dispute to fuel their economies. As such, the competition between Japan and 
the PRC for the resources in the Senkaku Islands EEZ and the actual control of access to 
that EEZ is likely to remain intense. Additionally, the political leadership in both Japan 
and the PRC is more assertive regarding the islands. As a corollary to this, both the 
leadership of Japan and the PRC is under considerable strain from nationalist sentiment 
rooted in the shared history of China and Japan. Another factor reinforcing the potential 
for conflict is the high amount of military development conducted by the PRC and 
Japan, especially in the fields of naval and aerospace development. This development 
has allowed Japan and the PRC to maintain a more forward military presence in the East 
China Sea. In the event of a conflict, China and Japan would lose considerably from this.  
 In the event of a war over the islands, there is potential for broader implications. 
In particular, the United States could be drawn into a conflict over the islands. While the 
United States is not a direct party to the dispute, it is obligated to defend Japan. This is 
due to the fact that the United States is obligated to defend Japan in the event of an 
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offensive attack on Japanese territory.143 This obligation is extended to the defending 
Japanese territories that are not considered prefectures. Indeed, the United States has 
reaffirmed that in the event of an invasion of the Senkaku Islands it would uphold the 
MST.144 There is tremendous conflict potential from this dispute.  
 Still, there are openings for the possibility of a solution to the conflict over the 
Senkaku Islands. Regarding the sharing of resources, the 2008 energy sharing agreement 
presents a possible precedent for resolving the conflict. With the agreement to jointly 
produce the oil resources at the Chunxiao Fields, the approach to distribute the resources 
could serve as a possible model for the development of the site. Nevertheless, in order to 
use this approach, the history that this dispute is linked to must be resolved, and both 
sides must make concessions on this area, particularly Japan. Moreover, the greater 
military presence held by both sides, but especially by the PRC, is especially 
concerning. These latter two concerns ultimately make resolution highly unlikely.  
 At the moment, the Senkaku Islands dispute itself lingers as a tremendous thorn 
in the side of Sino-Japanese ties. Although the dispute on the islands has not emerged in 
a prominent level on the international stage in the way it did in 2012, it is still a major 
issue for Sino-Japanese ties. The study of this territorial dispute allows for a better 
understanding of territorial disputes and how they can escalate from minor issues into 
greater disputes with the potential for conflict. Additionally, knowing the history of the 
progression of this dispute allows for a greater understanding of how the dispute came to 
its current point in recent years without a resolution in earlier negotiations. Looking 
ahead to the future, knowing the history of the dispute provides some understanding of                                                         
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the way ahead. For instance, the knowing the disputes’ past highlights the fact that 
despite the best intentions of preceding governments and heads of state, the dispute will 
likely to continue without either the governments of Japan or the PRC finding ways to 
make the resolution of this dispute a major priority, rather than the dispute itself 
becoming an auxiliary matter to other concerns. Since the dispute has significant 
potential for becoming a wider regional or even global conflict (given the United States’ 
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